{"id":150795,"date":"2026-01-15T08:30:18","date_gmt":"2026-01-15T07:30:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mallorcaglobalmag.es\/?p=150795"},"modified":"2026-01-15T13:10:29","modified_gmt":"2026-01-15T12:10:29","slug":"online-scams-balears-cyber-fraud","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mallorcaglobalmag.es\/en\/online-scams-balears-cyber-fraud\/","title":{"rendered":"Online scams in the Balearic Islands: facing the silent epidemic of cyber fraud"},"content":{"rendered":"

Online scams are soaring in the islands: from banking fraud and fake investments to attacks on tourism SMEs. A growing phenomenon where social engineering and rapid reaction are key<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

\"ciberstafas<\/p>\n

His name is Alex, or at least that\u2019s how he introduces himself. He claims to work at the bank where his victim, Daniela, is a client. He has managed to infiltrate the same thread of official messages from the bank and send an SMS warning of alleged unauthorised charges. The link appears legitimate; the tone, in a phone call, as well. The goal is simple: to obtain the login credentials to her online banking. The result is immediate: one thousand euros in *bizums* withdrawn from her account before she can stop it.<\/p>\n

Cases like Daniela\u2019s are increasingly common. Messages that raise suspicion, charges that don\u2019t add up or calls that appear legitimate are now part of daily digital life. David, a young Mallorcan, discovered it after seeing several payments on his card under the concept \u201cApple Music\u201d, a service he has never used. In both cases, the starting point is identical: a criminal managed to obtain part of their information or knew how to manipulate them into providing it.<\/p>\n

To understand how these networks operate in the Balearic Islands, Mallorca Global Mag spoke with the National Police officers specialised in investigating this type of crime: the Economic Crime and Technological Offences Group, part of the Provincial Judicial Police Brigade. From Palma they work in coordination with the National Cybercrime Unit, with other police headquarters in the country and with international organisations such as Europol and Interpol.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe most common fraud continues to be fraudulent charges on accounts or cards, especially those originating through smishing<\/em> and vishing<\/em>,\u201d explain Miguel \u00c1ngel L\u00f3pez Mart\u00edn, head of the Technological Crime Group in the Balearic Islands, and Jos\u00e9 Miguel M\u00e1rquez, deputy inspector of the same unit. The sequence usually begins with an SMS impersonating the bank and warning of suspicious activity. The link redirects to a fake page where the victim enters their credentials. Shortly after, a call from the bank\u2019s official number \u2014through spoofing<\/em>\u2014 requests the codes sent to the victim\u2019s mobile phone to \u201ccancel\u201d the operation. In reality, those codes authorise the fraudulent transfers.<\/p>\n

\"\"

Jos\u00e9 Miguel M\u00e1rquez and Miguel \u00c1ngel L\u00f3pez, from the Technological Crime Group of the Balearic Islands.<\/p><\/div>\n

Investment fever<\/h2>\n

Although this type of fraud is the most frequent, it is not the one growing the fastest. \u201cThe biggest increase we are seeing is in fake investments, especially those related to cryptocurrencies and unregulated platforms,\u201d they add. On social networks, scammers pose as energy companies, banks or even public figures to lure potential investors. Within weeks, the money disappears with no possibility of recovery. The police cite the UK and Eastern European countries as the origin of many of these operations. Others, such as sextortion<\/em>, typically operate from African countries or Indonesia.<\/p>\n

Regarding the use of AI, they say that \u201ccurrent modus operandi<\/em> work without it,\u201d so its use is not yet widespread, although they acknowledge isolated cases and potential applications (voice cloning, deepfakes<\/em>). At the same time, law enforcement is already incorporating AI to detect patterns and prioritise investigations.<\/p>\n

Mules and a precise structure<\/h2>\n

Officers confirm that modern cybercrime is not improvised. \u201cThere is a very clear division of tasks.\u201d At the base of the pyramid is the money mule, the holder of the receiving account. \u201cThey are often students, unemployed individuals, homeless people or drug users who participate in exchange for small sums.\u201d Above them is the recruiter, and higher still the intermediaries. At the top are those who design the scam or develop the technological tools.<\/p>\n

The ease of opening accounts and prepaid lines multiplies the opportunities to commit fraud. \u201cYou can go to a phone shop and buy 20 prepaid SIM cards under the name \u2018Donald Trump\u2019 \u2014they illustrate\u2014; or open an online account with minimal verification. These accounts are wide open to fraud.\u201d<\/p>\n

Once the money enters the mule\u2019s account, it moves quickly: transfers to third parties, overseas remittances or conversion into cryptocurrencies. \u201cIf the money leaves the destination account, forget it: traceability becomes complicated. These are people who will often be convicted of fraud but will never be able to repay \u20ac40,000 or \u20ac300,000.\u201d<\/p>\n

If the money leaves the destination account, forget it: traceability becomes complicated.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Transnational crime and banking obstacles<\/h2>\n

The main challenge in investigating these crimes is their transnational nature. Scammers use VPNs and private networks to hide their tracks. This dispersion requires international judicial and police cooperation and slows down precautionary measures. \u201cThe perpetrators know this and use it to their advantage: they move the money extremely quickly and convert it into virtual currency to add opacity.\u201d<\/p>\n

Relations with banks are another friction point: some institutions cooperate, while others, according to the police, hinder preventive blocks. Regulation (EU) 2024\/886 \u2014which requires verifying the match between account holder and beneficiary in certain transfers\u2014 represents progress. Since it came into force in October 2025, operations that previously went unnoticed are now being blocked.<\/p>\n\n\t\t